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NOMENClLATURE

A. Sets and Parameters
B. Functions A(t) Cumulative arrived EVs during [0, t]. D(t) Cumulative departed EVs during [0, t]. D min (t)
Cumulative minimum number of EVs by time t. U n ( ) Utility function of player n.
Potential function.
C. Variables N W,n (t) Demand for WBs of BSS n during time slot t. N D,n (t)
Supply for DBs of BSS n during time slot t. N S,n (t)
Swapped batteries in BSS n during time slot t. p W (t)
Prices of WBs during time slot t. p D (t)
Prices of DBs during time slot t. C D,0 (t)
Base prices of DBs during time slot t,
Coefficients with respect to total DBs during time slot t. C W,0 (t)
Base prices of WBs during time slot t, C W,0 (t) ≥0. [1] , EVs are being electrified the transportation systems, for their effectiveness in reducing emission, energy utilization and so on [1] , [2] . In comparison with plug-in charging solutions, battery swapping admits some merits, e.g., shorter service duration and lower replacement cost [2] - [5] . These features can help the soar of EVs, especially for electric buses and electric taxis [3] - [9] .
Among the solutions to explore the potentials of battery swapping charging, a well-designed and efficiently operated BSCS is one promising candidate. Within the BSCSs, three subsystems are always included, i.e., BSSs, BCSs and logistics systems connecting BSSs and BCSs [2] - [12] . Some studies have been conducted for planning issues [3] - [5] , [10] and operation problems [2] , [6] - [9] , [11] , [12] of BSCSs. In [3] , an optimal sizing and sitting method is proposed for the BSSs and BCSs connected to the distribution systems. Optimally charging facility design and inventory management strategies are given in [4] and [5] , respectively. A robust BSS design method is proposed to address the uncertainties of battery swapping demand in [10] , where BSSs are selected among gas stations.
The day-ahead management of BCSs is the hot research topic to improve the operational efficiency of BSCSs. A robust optimization problem is formulated to address uncertainties of battery swapping demand and energy prices in [2] . In [6] , an optimization free real-time decision making technique for a BSS is proposed to ensure the service availability. To manage the scalable charging in the BCS, a distributed optimal scheduling method is provided in [8] . A real-time operational strategy is proposed for an individual BCS to maximize its revenue under a market environment [9] . Furthermore, via providing ancillary services e.g., reserves [9] and black start service [11] , the BSCSs can improve the system efficiency and reliability. Unlike the static charging method mentioned above, where EVs should come to the BSSs [3] - [12] , a mobile charging method is proposed in [12] , including mobile battery swapping and mobile charging.
According to the aforementioned works, BCSs establish the interaction between the BSCS [2] , [3] , [7] , [9] , [11] and power systems, while BSSs link BSCSs with EV users [5] , [6] , [8] , [10] . However, these works only take the benefits of power systems [11] , BSCS [2] - [4] , [6] - [10] or EV users [5] , [12] into consideration, while omitting the benefits of others. To balance the benefits of all three entities, a detailed operational model of the BSCS should be formulated, considering the operational characteristics of BSCSs. Depleted batteries (DBs) should be swapped at BSSs and shipped to BCSs. After being charged, batteries should be delivered to BSSs as spares. This batteryswapping-charging-delivery process among BSSs and BCSs introduces a closed batteries logistic loop [13] , which can be modelled as a CLSC [14] .
Proposed in 2003, the CLSC is a novel logistical concept, with both FSC and RSC features. By systematic design, control, and operation, the CLSC has the potential to achieve the maximal value of products in the whole lifecycle, while saving energy and reducing environmental pollution [15] , [16] . In the BSCS, an FSC provides WBs from BCSs to EV users via BSSs, while a RSC collects DBs from EV users to BCSs via BSSs and charges these batteries. To guarantee QoS of battery swapping services, BSSs should store spare WBs at BSSs [13] and the BSCS can have more flexibility with more batteries being available. However, the capital cost of batteries is still high [1] , [2] , maintaining too great a battery inventory is unaffordable [1] , [5] . An efficient BSCS operation strategy should be proposed to balance the conflicts between operational cost and QoS.
Based on the existing results, this work introduces a CLSC scheme to model operation processes within BSCSs, where BCSs, BSSs and EV users are manufacturers, retailers and customers, respectively. Unlike the existing centralized operational methods [9] , [12] , [13] , a game theory based management method is proposed to balance the benefits among BCSs and BSSs, while guaranteeing the QoS. Generally, two branches of models are formulated in game theory, i.e., cooperative game and non-cooperative game models [17] . To create and capture value in unstructured interactions, cooperative game models show how players cooperate as coalitions by make binding agreements before playing the game [17] . The non-cooperative game model focuses on the strategy, utility, and procedure, which enables each player to make decisions individually. In this paper, a non-cooperative game is adopted to model the competition among the BCSs and BSSs of the CLSC, where the BCS and BSSs are owned by different entities.
As far as we know, it is the first time anyone has applied CLSC to model the closed battery loop in the BSCS. The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1) The battery-swapping-charging process in BSCSs is modeled as a CLSC, where the charging process in the BCS and battery swapping at BSSs are jointly optimized. The EV flow of BSSs is modeled as arrival, departure and minimal departure curves, using network calculus theory [18] .
2) The interaction among the BCSs and BSSs is formulated as an SG, where the BCS acts as the leader by setting prices for DBs and WBs; the BSSs act as the followers by optimizing their demand for the WBs, supply for DBs and battery swapping services.
3) The competition among the BSSs is modeled as an exact potential game, which includes at least one pure Nash equilibrium (NE).
4) An evolutionary algorithm framework, i.e., differential evaluation (DE) is employed to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed SG.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The CLSC based BSCSs is introduced in Section II, which is the BSCS operation model. The SG between the BCS and BSSs are presented in Section III. The mathematical features of the proposed SG are analyzed in Section IV. A DE-based SE computing algorithm is shown in Section V. The simulation and conclusion are given in Section VI and Section VII, respectively.
II. CLOSED LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN BASED BATTERY SWAPPING SYSTEMS
A. Battery Swapping and Charging Systems
A genetic BSCS framework is presented in this section. The BSCS has more than one BCS, multiple BSSs and a logistics system connecting the BCSs and BSSs [7] . Providing battery swapping services for EV users within a certain area, BSSs are the battery swapping service providers. Charging DBs collected from BSSs, BCSs are the battery charging service providers. Transferring WBs from BCSs to BSSs and collecting DBs from BSSs to BCSs, the logistic system is the battery transportation service provider. A classical BSCS consists of three layers: the terminal device layer, the station management layer and the management center layer [7] . Focusing on the operation of a BSCS, this paper studies the station and management center layer operation. Here, the station refers to BSSs and a BCS management center refers to the interaction between the BCS and BSSs.
A CLSC is an integrated logistics system, composed of manufacturer, retailers, consumers and logistic systems [14] , [15] . In the BSCS, EV users are consumers, BSSs are retailers, BCSs are the manufacturer, and the logistics are the batteries between the BCS and BSSs, which can be observed in Fig. 1 . Providing WBs from the BCS to EV users via BSSs is the FSC. Collecting DBs from EV users to the BCS via BSSs and charging DBs at the BCS is the RSC. Both the FSC and RSC, along with the logistics system formulate the CLSC. Considering the characteristics of the battery swapping charging processes, this paper has the following assumptions.
1) There is one and only one BCS in this BSCS, and all batteries are owned by the BCS.
2) Batteries are identical, i.e., DBs are of the same state of charge and WBs are of the same energy status.
3) BSSs are owned by different entities. 4) BCS is owned and operated by a DSO. 5) Deliver time between different stations, i.e., the BCS and BSSs, has not been considered.
6) The operational horizon is divided into equal discrete time slots, indexed by t, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }. 
B. Battery Swap Station
In one BSS, as shown in Fig. 2 , the correlation among the battery-swapping-collecting processes is depicted by three queues, i.e., EVs, WBs and DBs. Using network calculus,
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these queues can be modelled by different curves, serving as a general analysis framework for the operational analysis of BSSs.
1) EV Flow Model
A cumulative curves methodology, i.e., network calculus [18] , [19] , is used to model EVs queuing process at a given BSS. In this method, EVs can arrive in packets or in a continuum, depicted by the three curves, i.e., arrival curve, departure curve, and minimum departure curve, denoted by A(t), D(t) and D min (t), respectively. Assumed to be rightcontinuous, these functions are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Arrival Curve): An arrival curve A(t), t ≥ 0, is the total number of EVs arrived in [0, t].
Definition 2 (Departure Curve): A departure curve D(t), t ≥ 0, is the total number of EVs served in [0,t].
For a given BSS, a discrete-time model is adopted to model the arrival curve and departure curve in Fig. 3 . Moreover, D(t) ≤ A(t), ∀t ≥ 0 is treated as the causality constraint. In addition, a minimal departure curve is introduced to model the QoS requirements as follows. Definition 3 (Minimal Departure Curve): For an A(t), a minimal departure curve, denoted by D min (t), is defined as the cumulative minimum number of EVs meeting QoS requirements by time t, such that D min (t) ≤ A(t), ∀t ≥0.
Consider a fleet of EVs that arrive at BSS n according to an A(t). The arrival epochs, deadlines and scale of EVs are denoted by {t i }, {d i } and {n i }, respectively. D min (t) is a piecewise constant function which jumps at times {t i + d i }, where the sizes of the jumps being {d i } in Fig. 3 [18] . D min (t) is a constraint function such that D(t) ≥ D min (t), ∀t ≥0. The service policy at BSSs is earliest-deadline-first [19] .
2) Battery Flow Model
The battery flow is the description of 1) WBs from the BCS to EV users via BSSs and 2) DBs from EV users to the BCS via BSSs, corresponding to the FSC and RSC in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 .
To guarantee the QoS of battery swapping services, each BSS should reserve sufficient WBs to fulfill the battery swapping demand of EV users. Each BSS should submit its bid for WBs, N W,n (t), ∀t ≥ 0 to the BCS for the following day, according to prices of WBs set by the BCS. To charge DBs and manage the battery inventory, the BCS should collect DBs from BSSs. BSSs submit their offer for DBs, N D,n (t), ∀t ≥ 0 to BSSs, responding to prices of DBs set by the BCS.
C. Closed Loop Supply Chain for BSCS
Based on the roles of each player in CLSCs, three classes of CLSCs are generally adopted for the process management analysis, including model C, model R, and model M [15] . In model C, one integrated entity represents the manufacturer and retailer, in charge of production, sales, and logistics. In Model R, the products are produced by the manufacturer, and the sales and logistics are managed by the retailer. In Model M, the production and logistics are managed by the manufacturer, and the new product sales are operated by the retailer. Among these models, model C is a theoretical model and acts as a benchmark to evaluate the distributed models, i.e., model R and model M. In this paper, BSSs and the BCS are assumed to be owned and operated by different entities, where the logistics is managed by the BCS, formulating a model M type CLSC.
III. CLOSED LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN GAME
A. Game Formulation
As shown in Section II, in the day-ahead, BSSs submit their bids of WBs and offers of DBs to the BCS, responding to the prices set by the BCS. The BCS makes optimal scheduling to charge DBs, provides WBs to the BSS and collects DBs from BSSs according to the best bids and offers of BSSs. The day-ahead operation of BSCSs can be treated as a leadingfollowing decision making process, where the BCS acts as the leader and BSSs act as the followers. This leading-following interaction among the BCS and BSSs is modeled as an SG in this section.
As a non-cooperative game model, SG deals with the multilevel decision making process of several independent players responding to the decision taken by a leading player [21] . To model the competition among the BCS and BSSs, an SG is defined in normal form, Γ = {(N ∪ C), {S n }, n∈N ∪C , {U n }, n∈N ∪C }. S is (N + 1)-tuple of pure strategy sets, and U is (N +1)-tuple of payoff functions. The SG has the following components.
1) BSSs, which act as the followers and respond to the price set by the BCS.
2) The strategy space S n , n ∈ N , which corresponds to the battery swapping service, demand for WBs and supply for DBs, satisfying the constraints (6)- (13) . The utility function (1) captures the benefit of providing battery swap services.
3) The strategy space S C , corresponds to the scheduling plan of the BCS and prices of providing and collecting batteries from BSSs, and satisfying the constraints (15)- (22) . The utility function (14) captures the benefit of the BCS operator.
B. Decision Model for BSSs
For a BSS, it balances its benefits by providing battery swapping services, collecting DBs and administering the cost of ordering WBs. Its utility function can be depicted as follows: max ND,n(t),NW,n(t),NS,n(t),∀t≥0
To avoid simultaneously demand of WBs or supply of DBs, p F (t) and p D (t) are set according to the following functions:
What is more, the price for supplying DBs should always be bigger than 0. C D,0 (t) and C D,1 (t) should meet the following constraints:
Remark 1: With the price rules (2), (3), the utility function (1) has the following characteristics.
1) The utility function (1) of a BSS is non-decreasing with respect to per package of DBs to the BCS, when condition (4) holds. And the utility functions of the BSS are non-increasing with respect to per package of WBs from the BCS, as each BSS should pay for any increase demand of WBs unless it reaches its maximum demand level.
2) The marginal benefit of a BSS is a non-increasing function, as the level of benefit of the BSSs gradually becomes saturated as more WBs are consumed and DBs are supplied, i.e.,
3) With (2) and (3), the utility of a BSS depends not only on its strategy but also other BSSs' strategies. When demand of WBs rises at BSS n, the market price for WBs would rise. On behalf of their own utilities, the other BSSs should decrease their demand for WBs in the FSC. The supply of DBs can be explained in a similar way. Thus, BSSs and the BCS are price makers for DBs and WBs, i.e., the prices of WBs and DBs are decided by BSSs and the BCS.
For a BSS, its strategy x n , n ∈ N should be subjected to the following constraints to guarantee QoS. 1) Deadline Constraint: For the n-th BSS, its deadline constraints can be represented as follows:
2) Queue Length: For an A n (t) and departure D n (t), the quantity of EVs within the queue is A n (t) − D n (t). The maximal queue length at BSS n at time t is denoted by B n (t). The queue length limitation is depicted as follows:
Furthermore, B n (t) can be time-varying or time-constant.
3) Service-Curve Constraint: Given a service curve β n (t) [13] and an arrival curve A n (t), the quantity A n (t) ⊗ β n (t) represents the minimum cumulative EVs that must be served by time t, where ⊗ represents convolution in the min-plus algebra. For any given service curve β n (t), the minimum departure curve is given as follows: 
4) Inventory Constraint:
There are two kinds of batteries in a BSS, i.e., DBs and WBs. To provide guaranteed quality of the battery swapping service, a BSS should store sufficient WBs. Furthermore, the quantity of DBs within a BSS is limited by the number of EVs being served. Constraints for inventory are shown as follows:
The cumulative number of DBs, WBs and EVs departure are shown in (9)-(11). Constraints for DBs and WBs are shown in (12) and (13), respectively. To reduce the battery inventory within BSCSs, all DBs should be sent to the BCS by the end of operations, as depicted in (14) .
C. Decision Model for the BCS
Since the BCS is managed by a DSO, a day-ahead DSO optimal scheduling is proposed as the decision model of the BCS. For the given day-ahead wholesale market prices, DSO makes optimal day-ahead bidding to maximize its revenue. The utility function for BCS operator can be depicted as follows:
The strategy of the BCS, x X , should meet the following constraints:
The charging and discharging rate limitations within the BCS are shown in (16) and (17), respectively. To meet the demand for WBs, the minimum energy should be absorbed in the BCS as shown in (18) . Considering that backup batteries are DBs, the maximum energy the BCS can consume is shown in (19) . The quantity limitation of backup batteries is shown in (20) . Equation (21) depicts the power balance constraint within the distribution network. The price ranges of DBs and WBs are shown in (22) , (23), respectively. Definition 4 (Stackelberg equilibrium): Consider the SG Γ = {(N ∪C), {S n }, n∈N ∪C , {U n }, n∈N ∪C } defined in Section III-A. A strategy profile x * ∈ S is the SE of game Γ, if and only if it satisfies the following set of inequalities:
IV. EXISTENCE OF STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM A. Existence of NE for Game Among BSSs
In noncooperative games, the existence of equilibriums (in pure strategies) is not always guaranteed [18] . Therefore, for the proposed closed loop supply chain game Γ, it is necessary to investigate the existence of SEs. As shown in Section IV(A) and Fig. 5 , the best reaction of an individual BSS depends on not only the prices set by the BCS, i.e.,C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t), C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t), but also the strategy of other BSSs. In addition, game Γ is a hierarchical game, where the BCS is the leader and the BSSs are the followers. To verify the existence of an SE corresponding to game Γ, the competition among the BSSs is scrutinized first to reveal the relationship between the best reactions of the BSSs and the strategy of the BCS.
Definition 5 (Potential Game) [20] : A function Φ: S → R is called an exact potential function for the game G if for each n ∈ N and all x −n ∈ S −n ,
(25) The game G is called an exact potential game if it admits a potential function.
Proposition 1: The competition among BSSs, i.e., game G = {N , {S n } n ∈ N , {U n } n∈N } is an exact potential game.
Proof of proposition 1 is referred to in Appendix A. Lemma 1: Every potential game includes at least one pure Nash equilibrium (NE) [21] .
Theorem 1: For fixed parameters, C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t), C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t), at least one pure NE exists for game G.
Proof of theorem 1 is referred to in Appendix B. Proposition 2: The NE of game G is the solution of the following optimization problem:
Proof of proposition 2 is referred to in Appendix C.
B. Existence of SE for the Game Among BCS and BSSs
As shown in Section IV-A, the competition among BSSs, i.e., game Γ is an exact potential game, which admits at least one pure NE, when C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t),C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t) are given. It indicates that when C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t),C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t) exist, the best reactions of BSSs responding to the strategy of the BCS exist. Thus, the existence of an SE for game Γ depends on the existence of C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t),C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t).
Proposition 3:
The decision space of the BCS would not be empty, i.e., there exists at least one feasible operational plan for the BCS.
Proof of proposition 3 is referred to in Appendix D. Theorem 2: There exists at least one SE for game Γ. Proof of theorem 2 is referred to in Appendix E. An SE of game Γ is the solution of the following optimization problem [22] , in which the BCS sets its optimal strategy in response to the equilibrium demand of WBs and supply of DBs, i.e., max
V. GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION SOLVING METHOD
As shown in Section IV, an SE of game Γ is the optimal solution of (27) which is a bi-level optimization problem (BLPP). Popular ways to solve these kinds of BLPPs are mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [22] and evolutionary algorithms [23] . The MPEC requires assumptions of smoothness, linearity or convexity of the lower level optimization problem, based on the optimal conditions for lower level optimization problems [22] . However, the lower level optimization problem (26) is non-continuous, due to the variables in (1)- (14) being discrete. Consequently, an evolutionary algorithm, i.e., DE, is adopted to solve (27) . Furthermore, with attracting features, e.g., fast convergence speed and robust searching ability [5] , DE has been applied to compute the NE of two player games [24] . However, classical DE does not provide the constraint handling techniques, which is also a hot topic in evolutionary algorithms [25] . Luckily, when C D,0 (t), C W,0 (t), C D,1 (t) and C W,1 (t), ∀t ≥ 0 are optimized by DE, the upper level problem and lower level problem in (27) can be solved separately and efficiently by using mathematical algorithms, e.g., branch and bound, spatial branch and bound.
In (27) , the lower problem is an integer convex quadratic programming (ICQP) problem. ICQP can be solved efficiently by classical optimization techniques, e.g., spatial branch and bound [26] . In this paper, this ICQP is solved by a commercial software package, i.e., CPLEX 12.6 [26] .
For the upper level problem of (27) , when the prices, i.e., C D,0 (t), C W,0 (t), C D,1 (t) and C W,1 (t), ∀t ≥ 0 are predefined, the decision model is a mix-integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which can be efficiently solved using offshore solvers, e.g., Gurobi 6.0.
Based on the foregoing statement, when the prices, i.e., C D,0 (t), C W,0 (t), C D,1 (t) and C W,1 (t), ∀t ≥ 0 are given, the upper and lower problems can be solved separately by using mathematical methods. Thus, an enhanced DE is adopted in this paper to optimize the price profiles, i.e., adjusting prices considering the BCS and BSSs' decisions simultaneously. The details about DE are referred to in [27] . The pseudo code of the self-adapting DE algorithm, together with the mathematical algorithms for becoming an SE, is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Self-adapting DE algorithm
Step 1: Randomly generate Np number of initial trial solutions P , F and C R parameters.
Step 2: For i = 1 to Np, produce an offspring Q i using the standard DE [27] . For offspring i = 1 to Np, do 1) Solve (26) by using CPLEX 12.6; 2) Obtain the solution in 1), solve (27) by using Gurobi 6.0, and obtain the fitness of offspring Q i by (15); 3) Assess the violation of constraints by using the constraint handling method in [25] .
Step 3: Select between P and Q using the selection operation in [27] .
Step 4: While stop criterion is not met, go to Step 2. Note that the stop criterion in DE is an open question and depends on the problems in [27] . The stop criterion in this paper is referred to the maximal iteration which should not exceed a predefined iteration, e.g., 1000 iterations.
VI. CASE STUDY
A. Case Description
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed management strategy, a test system is adopted. One BCS with three BSSs is modelled in this test system. Among the BSSs, two BSSs provide battery swapping services for 1000 electric taxis, and the left BSS provide battery swapping services for 200 electric buses. The battery swapping demand for each type of vehicle is taken from [28] . It is further assumed that EVs should be served within 1 h or 2 h, with proposition 0.5 and 0.5, respectively. The queuing processes of each BSS are illustrated in Fig. 5 . The day-ahead price profile is taken from CAISO on July 1, 2016 [29] . The load profile and outputs of the PV are taken from [30] . The upper boundaries for C D,0 (t) , C D,1 (t), C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t) are set to $23.2927 per package, $0.1288 per package 2 , $5.7906 per package and $0.01 per package 2 , respectively. The lower boundaries for C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t), C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t) are set to $10.0534 per package, $0 per package 2 , $0 per package and $0 per package 2 , respectively. $23.2927 is calculated according to the fuel price [31] , electric vehicle efficiency and fueled vehicle efficiency [32] , and the equivalent price for each WB. $10.0534 is calculated according to the net present value of batteries and electric price obtained from [31] , where the discount rate is set to 10%, which can guarantee the benefit of the BCS. C A = $200/kWh, which is the same prices of Tesla batteries nowadays [33] . In CLSCs, the model C type CLSC is always treated as a benchmark for other type CLSCs [15] . The decision model for model C type CLSC is depicted as follows:
s.t. (6)- (14), (16)- (21) (
The objective function in (28) is referred to as the social welfare of game Γ. In this paper, model (28) is a benchmark of the proposed method. Furthermore, three step by step scenarios are established to verify the proposed model M based CLSC BSCS operation method. These three scenarios are shown as follows:
Scenario I: The departure curve of each BSS i equals its arrival curve, which means each BSS would provide battery swapping service as EVs' arrival curve. Model C type CLSC management is applied.
Scenario II: Model C type CLSC management is applied. Scenario III: Model M type CLSC management is adopted, where the BSCS is managed by the proposed Stackelberg game in Section IV.
It is noted that, the comparison between Scenario I and Scenario II is to show the benefits for BSCS considering the flexibility of the battery swapping demand, and the comparison between Scenario II and Scenario III is to show whether the competitions among the BSSs and BCS will result in efficiency loss and whether the proposed method can balance the benefits among players or not.
The maximal iteration of DE is set to 1000, and N p = 300. The simulation is conducted on a PC with 8G RAM and Intel i7-4770MQ@2.4GHz.
B. Results of Scenario I and Scenario II
When BSSs provide battery swapping services as EVs' arrival curve and the BCS optimizes the charging process, the results are shown in Fig. 6 . As shown in Fig. 6(a) , to meet BSSs' demand for WBs during 1:00 to 5:00, which can be observed from Fig. 5 , the BCS needs to charge more backup batteries in Scenario I. On the other hand, the battery shortage periods is shifted to 5:00, 8:00 and 20:00, as shown in Fig. 6(b) . This shift reduces the number of backup batteries from 142 to 101, which is about 28.87% smaller than Scenario I, as shown in Table I . The reduction of backup batteries results in the decrease of the total cost by 92.22%. The battery swapping service curve of each BSS is shown under Scenario II in Fig. 7 . As shown in Fig. 7 , the battery swap service curve is below both the arrival curve and WBs curve, the battery swap service curve is beyond the minimal departure curve, and the WBs curve is beyond the DBs curve. It can be concluded that, when model C type CLSC is used, the QoS can be guaranteed.
Based on the simulation results shown in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Table I , it can be concluded that through the optimal operation of the BSSs, the BSCS can realize optimal inventory management while guaranteeing QoS of the battery swapping service.
C. Results of the Proposed Method
In this section, model M type CLSC is implemented. When Algorithm 1 is used to compute the SE, the convergence curve of the BCS' utility (15) is shown in Fig. 8 . As shown in Fig. 8, after 1000 As shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , p W (t) ∈ $ [11.7906, 23 .2927] per package, p D (t) ∈ $[0, 5.7906] per package. These prices are within a feasible boundary, which means the EVs are more attractive than fuel vehicles while guaranteeing the benefit of the BCS and BSSs.
The simulation results above have demonstrated the merits of the proposed method: balance the benefits among the BCS and BSSs while guaranteeing the efficiency and QoS, since the total costs under Scenario II and Scenario III are the same, which is shown in Table I .
VII. CONCLUSION
A CLSC management scheme is proposed for a BSCS. In the BSCS, there is one BCS and multiple BSSs, where the BCS is managed by a DSO and the BSSs are owned and operated by other players. The network calculus is employed to model the arrival, departure and swapping services of EVs at a BSS. An M type CLSC is proposed to model the battery-swappingcharging characteristics between the BCS and BSSs. Furthermore, an SG based method is proposed to balance the benefits among the BCS and BSSs. In the SG, the BCS acts as the leader to maximize its utility by setting optimal prices and an operational day-ahead operational plan. BSSs act as followers to maximize their own benefits by optimally demanding WBs, supplying DBs and providing battery swapping services while guaranteeing the QoS. The existence of SEs for the proposed game is proved. A DE based hybrid algorithm is proposed to compute the SE for the SG. Based on real data and a step by step simulation, results have demonstrated the merits of the proposed scheme in improving the operational efficiency, guaranteeing QoS, and balancing the benefits among the BCS and BSSs while maximizing the social welfare.
As the SOC of the DBs might not be the same, further work should propose some classification methods [34] . The BCS can provide not only demand response but also ancillary services to power systems. Last but not least, network calculus has the potential to model the demand flexibility in the smart grid.
In this paper, the batteries are assumed to be owned by the BCS and the logistic system is managed by the BCS. When the batteries are owned by the BSSs and the BSSs compete for the charging capacity in the BCS, a generalized Stackelberg game is a powerful tool to manage the competition among this BSCS. This will be our future work in managing the BSCS. Φ(x) meets condition (25) . This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof : According to proposition 1, game G is an exact potential game, when C D,0 (t), C D,1 (t), C W,0 (t) and C W,1 (t) are given. Furthermore, an exact potential game admits at least one pure NE. Thus, game G has at least one pure NE.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: Consider the optimal solution x * ∈ S n , n ∈ N of (26). For any n ∈ N, if there exist any better strategies for y n , with respect to x * −n , i.e., Φ(y n , x * −n ) − Φ(x * n , x * −n ) = U(y n , x * −n ) − U(x n , x * −n ) > 0, ∃i ∈ N (A2)
consequently, x * is not the optimal solution of (26), which is contradictory to the premise. This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Consider following x C , where C D,0 (t) = 0, C D,1 (t) = 0, C W,0 (t) = 0, C W,1 (t) = 0, N A (t) = N D (t), P C (t)η c = N D (t)∆E and P DC (t) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0. x C is a feasible solution to the BCS's decision making problem (14)- (22) , which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: As shown in Proposition 2, the strategy space of the BCS is non-empty. Based on Theorem 1, the NE of game G depends on the prices set by the BCS. Thus, the optimal solution of the BCS's decision making problem is the SE of game Γ. This completes the proof.
